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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a). 
On November 26, 2017, the district court dismissed all claims against 
Defendant with leave to amend.  ER2-ER27.1  On January 19, 2018, Plaintiff 
Kristanalea Dyroff filed a Notice of Intent Not to File an Amended Complaint.  
CD31.  On that same day, the district court entered judgement in favor of Defendant 
and against Plaintiff, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.  ER1.  The 
dismissal and order of judgment gave this Court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
Plaintiff timely appealed on February 2, 2018. ER28-ER31. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Defendant designed its website to identify the meaning of, and intent 
behind, its users’ posts.  Defendant used that information to infer characteristics 
about those users and to pair them with other users who shared related 
characteristics.  Defendant used this functionality to identify Wesley Greer as a 
heroin addict, and to steer him to posts made by heroin dealers on its website.  Did 
the district court err in holding that Defendant’s promotion of posts involving the 
                                                 
1 “ER__” denotes the Excerpts of Record, while “CD__” denotes numbered entries 
in the district court clerk’s docket. 
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sale of heroin did not make it responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
development of information related to those posts? 
2. The CEO of Defendant’s website publicly stated that he had elected to 
shut the website down in order to avoid law enforcement requests related to unlawful 
user activity.  Did the district court err in holding that this statement, along with 
Defendant’s anonymity policy for its users, did not make it responsible, in whole or 
in part, for the creation or development of information related to unlawful posts that 
it fostered on its website? 
3. Defendant’s website identified Wesley Greer as a heroin addict and 
steered him towards posts advertising the sale of heroin.  Among those were posts 
from Hugo Margenat-Castro, a man Defendant knew to be under investigation for 
selling fentanyl and who had been arrested several times for having done so. With 
this knowledge, Defendant identified Wesley Greer as a heroin addict and purposely 
directed him to Margenat-Castro, from whom Mr. Greer purchased a fatal dose of 
fentanyl, advertised as heroin.  Did the district court err in holding that Defendant’s 
misfeasance did not create a risk to Mr. Greer and therefore that it owed him no duty 
of care? 
4. Did the district court err in holding that Defendant owed no duty of care 
to Wesley Greer as an invitee? 
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews de novo a complaint’s dismissal under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Stearns v. Ticketmaster Corp., 655 F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th 
Cir. 2011).  “Dismissal is proper only where there is no cognizable legal theory or 
an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro 
v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). To survive a motion to dismiss, the 
complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.” Taylor v. Yee, 780 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). “The 
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more 
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqball, 
556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 557).  The Court must “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as 
true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party.” Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 559 F.3d 1028, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(citation and quotation omitted). 
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IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Introduction 
Plaintiff Kristanalea Dyroff seeks to hold Defendant2 liable for its role in the 
death of her son, Wesley Greer.  Until shutting down in March 2016, Defendant’s 
social network website was a haven for drug traffickers and, correspondingly, a peril 
for vulnerable addicts. Defendant did not serve as a passive conduit for the drug 
sales.  Instead, it contributed to these unlawful enterprises in multiple, material ways.   
First, through its recommendations functionality—which drew on 
Defendant’s specific knowledge of its users, obtained via algorithms, data mining 
technology, and inferences drawn from the demographic characteristics—Defendant 
identified vulnerable addicts and steered them through an echo chamber, pushing 
those users into continued contact with dealers through groups with names such as 
“I Need Heroin” and “I Can Help With Connect in Orlando FL.”  Defendant also 
                                                 
2 Plaintiff filed this action against the following entities: Experience Project, 
Kanjoya, Inc. (“Kanjoya”), and Ultimate Software Group, Inc. (“Ultimate Software 
Group”).  ER32-ER88.  Ultimate Software Group purchased all of the interests in 
Experience Project from Kanjoya in 2016, and Kanjoya was subsequently merged 
with Ultimate Software Group.  Because Ultimate Software Group is the only one 
of the three entities currently in existence, Plaintiff dismissed her claims against 
Experience Project and Kanjoya in the underlying litigation without prejudice.  
CD18.  Although Ultimate Software Group is the Defendant, the acts and practices 
detailed herein arise from Experience Project. Accordingly, Plaintiff refers to all 
three entities as either “Experience Project” or “Defendant.”  
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oversaw a messaging functionality that would connect addicts with dealers and 
would alert addicts to new posts in groups related to the sale of drugs.    
Second, Defendant’s content generation guidelines were developed to assure 
anonymity of users, which fact was seized upon by dealers.  This decision was not 
neutral—Defendant publicly stated that it sought to preserve online anonymity of its 
users, at least in part, to combat law enforcement investigations and requests for 
information.  Indeed, once those requests for information became voluminous (given 
the ubiquity of criminal activity on Defendant’s website), Defendant shuttered the 
site rather than aid any investigations. 
Plaintiff’s son was a victim of the environment created and maintained by 
Defendant.  In August of 2015, Wesley, a recovering heroin addict, established an 
account with Defendant’s website and, like other vulnerable users, was steered 
towards multiple groups devoted to the sale of heroin.  Subsequently, he was steered 
towards a man named Hugo Margenat-Castro, from whom he purchased what he 
believed to be heroin, but what was in reality fentanyl, a lethal substance 50 times 
more potent than heroin.  That lack of knowledge led to Wesley’s overdose and death 
on August 19, 2015.  While Wesley did not know that Margenat-Castro sold 
fentanyl, Defendant did know or should have known.  Margenat-Castro was the 
subject of multiple controlled buys and arrests from various law enforcement 
agencies throughout 2015, and the investigations surrounding those arrests led 
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authorities to Defendant’s website, and led to numerous requests from law 
enforcement related to Margenat-Castro.  Therefore, prior to Wesley’s death, 
Defendant knew or should have known not only that Margenat-Castro was 
trafficking drugs on Experience Project, but that he was trafficking fentanyl.  Had 
Defendant warned Wesley of this fact, he would not have overdosed and died. 
  B. Factual Background 
i. The Experience Project Website 
Experience Project was a social networking website active from 2007 until 
March 2016.  ER38:¶18.  The website consisted of various “online communities” or 
“groups” that were formed by members based on common interests or attributes.  Id. 
Users were required to register with the site in order to join these communities or 
groups, but per the website’s policy they did so anonymously.  ER38:¶19, ER46:¶36-
ER48:¶42.  Once a user joined a group, he or she could post questions or comments 
to that group or respond to another user’s comments or questions.  ER39:¶21. 
This user interaction generated revenue for Experience Project in several 
ways. ER39:¶22. First, the website served ads to its users.  Id.  Second, users could 
buy “tokens” that they could then use to ask other members questions.  ER41:¶25.  
Third, the website used data mining techniques, including the use of machine 
learning models, to analyze its users’ posts, divining the content (by “assessing entire 
sentence structures”) as well as the underlying emotions associated with the posts.  
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ER39:¶22, ER40:¶23.  Defendant used the information created from that data mining 
for several purposes, including selling the data sets to various third parties (ER39-
ER40:¶22, citing http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/wp2017-01.pdf), 
but also using what it learned about its users to steer them to other groups, in order 
to keep them engaged on the site (ER41:¶27-ER42:¶28).  Experience Project would 
identify these additional groups and tailor them to individual users through its 
recommendations functionality.  Id.  This recommendations functionality would take 
data that Experience Project gleaned from its users—including the content of a given 
group, the content posted by users within the group, the demographic data known by 
Experience Project about a given user (including geographic location)—and would 
then compile that data and draw inferences from that compilation about what other 
interactions a user might seek on the website.  Id.  All of these data points were 
derived, bundled, maintained, and used for Defendant’s commercial gain. Id.  
 In part because of its opportunity for anonymous-yet-public dialogue, 
Experience Project became a popular medium for drug dealers and drug addicts.  
ER41:¶26-ER45:¶35, ER47:¶41-ER48:¶42.  Defendant did not sit idly by as these 
two demographic groups sought each other out.  Instead, through its 
recommendations functionality, Defendant first identified and the tempted 
vulnerable drug addicts with continual entreaties to connect with drug dealers, thus 
encouraging further interactions (and valuable data generated therefrom) through the 
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website’s feedback loop. ER41:¶26-ER45:¶35  Among the drugs that were trafficked 
on the website were heroin and other opiates. ER42:¶30. 
 Experience Project facilitated this activity with full knowledge.  It was aware 
of the dangerous and unlawful sale of drugs on its property, both through the data it 
acquired and utilized in the course of its mining and manipulation of users’ posts 
(ER46:¶38) and as the result of myriad requests for information from law 
enforcement, which arose from separate criminal investigations and/or prosecutions 
related to the illegal activity perpetrated on the website.  ER47:¶39-ER48:¶42, 
ER54:¶65-¶68, ER56:¶71, ER56:¶73, ER54:n.13.  Concerning the latter, eventually 
the requests from law enforcement became too much, and Experience Project elected 
to shut the website down rather than aid investigations into criminal activity.  
ER47:¶39-ER48:¶42.  On March 21, 2016, the website posted an open letter to its 
users, stating that a “deep[]” and “troubling trend[]” threatened the website; 
specifically, “[o]nline anonymity, a core part of EP, is being challenged like never 
before.  Governments and their agencies are aggressively attacking the foundations 
of internet privacy with a deluge of information requests, subpoenas, and warrants.”  
ER47:¶41.  Accordingly, the website announced that it would be “taking a break.”  
Id. 
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ii. The Death of Wesley Greer 
Wesley Greer was a recovering heroin addict, having become addicted to the 
drug following an over-prescription of opiates after a sports injury in college.  
ER49:¶44-¶48.  After multiple attempts at rehabilitation, Wesley had managed to 
stay clean beginning in August, 2013, following a 9-month stay at a treatment 
facility.  ER49:¶46.  In February, 2015, Wesley moved to Brunswick, Georgia, with 
his mother and stepfather who wanted to support Wesley in his recovery.  ER49:¶48.  
However, in August 2015, Wesley succumbed, conducting a web search to find 
heroin that led him to the Experience Project site.  ER50:¶49.  He then registered for 
an account, paid for tokens to ask questions of other users, and began posting to 
groups related to the sale of heroin. ER50:¶49-¶50.  Subsequently, through 
Experience Project’s messaging functionality, the website directly alerted Wesley to 
new posts in these groups. ER50:¶52. 
At or around this time, a fellow Experience Project user, Hugo Margenat-
Castro, had been posting in multiple groups under the alias “Potheadjuice,” 
purporting to sell heroin.  In reality, Margenat-Castro was selling fentanyl, a 
synthetic opioid that is 50 times more potent than heroin and is a substance so toxic 
that a dose the size of three grains of sugar is fatal to an adult. ER50:¶53-¶54, 
ER51:¶58.  Margenat-Castro sold pure fentanyl and/or heroin laced with fentanyl, 
used Experience Project as his exclusive vehicle for drug sales, and availed himself 
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not only of its anonymity policy and content guideline, but also of its 
recommendations and messaging functionality, as well as its antipathy towards 
requests for information from law enforcement about criminal activity on the site.  
ER52:¶59.  Margenat-Castro sold drugs five sales a day, seven days a week, from 
January 1, 2015 until October 1, 2015.  ER51:¶58, ER52:¶60, ER52:n.11, 
ER52:n.12.  He did this exclusively through Experience Project, which is 
corroborated by an almost 1:1 ratio of profile views to drug sales.  ER52:¶60, 
ER52:n.11, ER52:n.12.  
Since January, 2015, multiple law enforcement agencies had targeted 
Margenat-Castro for his drug trafficking on Experience Project, conducting 
controlled buys and effecting subsequent arrests multiple times in the Spring and 
Summer of 2015.  ER51:¶61.  In the course of these investigations during this time 
period, Experience Project would or should have had actual knowledge of Margenat-
Castro’s illegal activities on the website—including the fact that he was selling 
fentanyl despite his representations that he was simply selling heroin.  ER54:¶65-
¶66, ER54:n.13. 
On or about the night of August 17, 2015, Wesley made contact with 
Margenat-Castro, via Experience Project, and arranged to buy what he believed to 
be heroin.  ER50:¶55.  In reality, he had purchased a lethal dose of fentanyl.  Id.  On 
the evening of August 18, 2015, Wesley ingested the drugs he had purchased.  
  Case: 18-15175, 06/13/2018, ID: 10907234, DktEntry: 12, Page 19 of 62
Dyroff v. The Ultimate Software Group – No. 18-15175                                                                                                                                                                                         
11 
 
ER51:¶56.  By August 19, 2015, at 11:55 A.M., Wesley was declared dead of 
fentanyl toxicity; his death was listed as a homicide.  ER51:¶57. 
A. Procedural History 
Plaintiff Kristanalea Dyroff, individually and on behalf of her son’s estate, 
filed a lawsuit against Defendants Ultimate Software Group, Experience Project, and 
Kanjoya, Inc. in California Superior Court on August 16, 2017. ER32-ER88.  Her 
complaint advanced seven claims: negligence (Count One), wrongful death (Count 
Two), premises liability (Count Three), failure to warn (Count Four), civil 
conspiracy (Count Five), unjust enrichment (Count Six), and violation of the Drug 
Dealer Liability Act, Cal. Health and Safety Code §§ 11700, et seq. (Count Seven). 
ER56-ER67 Subsequently, Defendant Ultimate Software Group filed a Notice of 
Removal on September 15, 2017. CD1.  Shortly thereafter, Defendant Ultimate 
Software Group moved to dismiss the Complaint (CD13); Plaintiff opposed (CD15); 
and Defendant filed its reply (CD16).  The district court heard oral argument on 
November 2, 2017 (CD20), and on November 26, 2017 it issued an order granting 
Defendant’s motion to dismiss and allowing Plaintiff leave to amend (ER2-ER27). 
Plaintiff timely appealed on February 2, 2018. ER28-ER31. 
B. The Ruling Below 
For all of Plaintiff’s claims except for her failure to warn claim, the district 
court held that Defendant was entitled to immunity under Section 230 of the 
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Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“Section 230”).  ER3.  In the 
court’s view, Plaintiff’s claims sought to hold Defendant (a website) liable for 
content posted by third parties, which is precluded by Section 230.  ER3.  Although 
Plaintiff asserted that her claims did not arise from third-party content, but rather 
from specific behavior and functionality on the part of the website,3 the court 
disagreed, finding that “only third parties posted information on Experience Project, 
and the website operator did not solicit unlawful information or otherwise create or 
develop content.” ER16.   
The district court also rejected Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant’s policies 
and procedures knowingly sanctioned, aided, and abetted the illegal activity on its 
website, thereby helping “develop” the content and precluding Section 230 
immunity.  ER18-ER20.  Although Plaintiff provided a statement from the website’s 
founder announcing that he was shuttering the site because of “troubling trends” 
related to law enforcement interest in the website and its users’ illegal activity, 
resulting in “a deluge of information requests, subpoenas, and warrants,” the court 
held that this was not a sufficient indicium that the website condoned and enabled 
                                                 
3 As the district court correctly summarized, Plaintiff alleged that Experience Project 
“used ‘data mining’ techniques and ‘machine learning’ algorithms and tools to 
collect, analyze and ‘learn[] the meaning and intent behind posts’ in order to 
‘recommend’ and ‘steer’ vulnerable users, like her son, to forums frequented by drug 
users and dealers.” ER15.  Plaintiff challenged these acts and practices, which 
“‘created an environment where vulnerable addicts were subjected to a feedback 
loop of continual entreaties to connect with drug dealers.’” Id. 
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its users’ bad acts.  ER19.  The court reached a different inference, finding “[t]he 
statement manifest[ed] a concern with Internet privacy…and does not establish 
antipathy to law enforcement.” Id.  The website’s “policy about anonymity may have 
allowed illegal conduct,” the court held, but ultimately neither the policy nor the 
“neutral tools [that] facilitated user communications” could be said to “‘create’ or 
‘develop’ information, even in part.” Id.  Accordingly, in the court’s view, Section 
230 foreclosed all of Plaintiff’s claims save for her failure to warn claim. 
The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s failure to warn claim4 on the grounds 
that no duty was owed to Wesley Greer by Defendant, either because of a special 
relationship between the parties or because of the website’s role in creating the risks 
that gave rise to his overdose and homicide.  ER20-ER26.  Concerning the former 
point, the court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that social media websites “are ‘the 
twenty-first century equivalent of a brick and mortar business…like restaurants, 
bars,…amusement parks, and all businesses open to the public,’” holding that “[t]his 
makes no sense practically.  Imposing a duty at best would result in a weak and 
ineffective general warning to all users.” ER24.  Further, imposing a duty of care 
would be inappropriate as “[r]isk can be more apparent in the real world than in the 
virtual social-network world.” ER25.  Concerning a duty imposed as a result of the 
                                                 
4 As stated by the district court, Plaintiff contended that Defendant “had a duty to 
warn Mr. Greer that Mr. Margenat-Castro was selling fentanyl-laced heroin via the 
Experience Project website.” ER20. 
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website’s pushing drug addicts to engage with drug dealers (i.e., its misfeasance), 
the court held that Defendant’s “use of the neutral tools and functionalities on its 
website did not create a risk of harm that imposes an ordinary duty of care.” ER26. 
The court dismissed all claims with leave to amend.  ER27. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court erred in three respects.   
First, it mischaracterized Experience Project’s recommendations functionality 
and push notifications—which in the instant matter identified a vulnerable heroin 
addict and relentlessly steered him to a known drug trafficker—as “content-neutral 
tools” worthy of Section 230 Immunity.  Instead, Plaintiff’s allegations demonstrate 
that the website was specifically designed to make subjective, editorial decisions 
about users based on their posts.  Although the website could classify users in benign 
categories (e.g., “I’m going to Stanford”) it also was able to (and did) identify and 
categorize users according to characteristics that were both unlawful and, more 
importantly, profoundly harmful to those grouped individuals.  This conduct was 
particularly dangerous—and far from neutral—because Experience Project would 
then steer the users it identified as heroin addicts to users it had identified as heroin 
dealers, thereby facilitating a drug deal. 
It cannot be overstated that the Defendant professed to know exactly what 
each of its users were posting and what the intent was behind each post.  The conduct 
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Plaintiff challenged is therefore not a neutral action wholly reliant on third-party 
inputs, but instead the product of a series of knowing, deliberate acts, unlawfully and 
independently undertaken by Defendant and Defendant, alone.  Indeed, neither the 
drug-trafficker user nor the drug-addict user had any control over the functionality 
challenged by Plaintiff; Margenat-Castro could not have steered Wesley Greer to his 
posts even if he tried.  The agency lay exclusively with Defendant.  Under 
controlling Ninth Circuit authority, such deliberate acts are not subject to Section 
230 immunity, and instead clearly evidence the development, on the part of the 
website, of its own, harmful content.   
Second, the district court erred in refusing to credit Plaintiff’s well-pleaded 
allegations that Experience Project not only knew of the activity occurring on the 
website, but condoned the bad acts and even colluded with the bad actors using the 
site, through its posting policies and through its stated antipathy towards law 
enforcement.  Although the district court was presented with a public statement by 
Experience Project’s CEO that he was shuttering the website due to a “deluge of 
information requests, subpoenas, and warrants” (rather than aid authorities), it 
declined to draw the entirely plausible and logical inference that such a statement 
indicated sympathy for users who were the subject of those requests (including 
Margenat-Castro) and antipathy towards law enforcement.  Rather, and improperly, 
the district court explained this away as “a concern with Internet privacy that has 
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been widespread in the technology sector.”  This refusal to draw all inferences in 
Plaintiff’s favor—particularly when courts have done so under nearly identical 
circumstances when applying this Court’s law—is reversible error. 
Third, the district court erred in finding that Defendant owed no duty to warn 
Wesley Greer of what it already knew from multiple, previous requests from law 
enforcement: that Margenat-Castro was trafficking not in heroin, but rather in pure 
fentanyl (a substance 50 times more deadly).  This is incorrect for two reasons.  First, 
under California law, a defendant owes a duty to warn of a danger created by his 
own misfeasance.  The dangers endemic to Defendant’s website were of Defendant’s 
own making and were not the result of “neutral” tools, as the district court 
improperly held.  Second, even if the risk did not arise from Defendant’s 
misfeasance, it nonetheless owed Wesley Greer a duty under time-honored legal 
principles.  Experience Project, a social media website where users are encouraged 
to congregate and interact, is the twenty-first century equivalent of a brick-and-
mortar establishment such as restaurants, bars, theaters, fairs, auditoriums, stadiums, 
amusement parks, and all other businesses open to the public.  Under California law, 
a business establishment must exercise reasonable care for the safety of its invitees 
and is liable for injuries resulting from a breach of this duty. 
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VI. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred in Holding That Defendant Was Not 
Responsible, in Whole or In Part, for the Creation or Development 
of the Posts Facilitating Heroin Trafficking on Its Website. 
 
The district court incorrectly held that Section 230 precluded Plaintiff’s 
claims, misconstruing the statute to mean that a challenge the website’s 
recommendations functionality – which used algorithms and machine learning to 
identify heroin and then steer them towards heroin dealers – amounted to a challenge 
of “neutral tools” of the website.  This misreads the Court’s unambiguous authority 
on the scope of Section 230 immunity and fundamentally misunderstands the nature 
and purpose of algorithms, which despite being computer code are nonetheless 
suffused with their designer’s intent. 
Where, like here, a website is designed to intentionally perform a specific act, 
and this act is what gives rise to a plaintiff’s claim, Section 230 immunity does not 
apply.  Accordingly, the district court should be reversed. 
i. The Scope of Section 230 Immunity Delineated By This 
Court 
 
Section 230 states, in relevant part, that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C.S. § 230(c)(1).  The 
statute defines an “interactive computer service” as “any information service, 
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by 
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multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that 
provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by 
libraries or educational institutions.” Id. at § 230(f)(2).   
In contrast to an interactive computer service, an “information content 
provider” is “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the 
creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other 
interactive computer service.”  Id. at § 230(f)(3).  Neither “creation” nor 
“development” is defined in the statute.   
This Court holds that Section 230 bars a plaintiff’s claim against (1) a provider 
of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat as a publisher 
(3) of information provided by another information content provider. Barnes v. 
Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2009).  Consistent with the 
definitions laid out in the statute, if the defendant website had no hand in “the 
creation or development” of content posted on the website, then it has immunity 
under Section 230, as it is an “interactive computer service.” Fair Housing Council 
of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 
2008) (en banc).  If, on the other hand, it had a role in creating or developing the 
content at issue, it becomes an “information content provider,” and Section 230 does 
not apply.  Id.   
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While this Court has described the scope of Section 230’s immunity in 
broad terms, it has also made clear that the statute does not “create a lawless no-
man’s-land on the internet.” Id. at 1164.5 
1. When a Website Materially Manipulates Third-Party 
Content, Creating Additional Content Therefrom, It 
“Develops” That Content and Has No Immunity 
Under Section 230. 
 
The key authority in this Court that outlines the scope of Section 230 
immunity is Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com. This 
opinion held that a website “develops” content otherwise posted by third parties (and 
thus loses Section 230 immunity) when it materially manipulates that content, 
including by passively directing its creation or by improperly using the content, after 
the fact.  521 F.3d at 1168.   
The defendant, Roommates.com, was a website designed to match people 
looking to share housing.  Id. at 1161.  In order to post or search for listings a user 
would have to create an account profile, in which they were required to disclose 
personal information including sex, family status, and sexual orientation.  Id.  Users 
could search for and view other profiles based on the characteristics in those profiles, 
                                                 
5 See, also, Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 852 (9th Cir. May 31, 2016) 
(“[T]he CDA does not declare a general immunity from liability deriving from 
third-party content.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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and based on the criteria they either posted or viewed, exchange emails with other 
users via the website.  Id.   
The Fair Housing Councils of the San Fernando Valley and San Diego sued 
the website for violating multiple housing discrimination laws, challenging the 
website’s requirement that users include age, sex, and family status in their profiles 
and also challenging the website’s use of those potentially discriminatory profiles in 
its search functionality and email notification system.  Id. at 1162, 1165.  The 
website claimed that its practices were shielded by Section 230, as the plaintiffs’ 
challenges amounted to grievances over content that was posted by its users, who 
were the true “information content providers” in the transaction, and that the website 
itself was merely a passive conduit for those posts.  Id. 
This Court disagreed—while it was true that the posts were created by third 
parties, “the fact that users are information content providers does not preclude 
Roommate from also being an information content provider by helping ‘develop’ at 
least ‘in part’ the information in the profiles.” Id. at 1165. (emphasis original).  One 
dispositive data point was that the website was designed to guide users to disclose 
data about themselves that could lead to discrimination in their housing options.  Id.  
This functionality, coded into the website, “materially contribute[d]” to the “alleged 
unlawfulness,” such that the website became a co-developer of the content, and thus 
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became an “information content provider” that was beyond the protection of Section 
230.  Id.   
Additionally, this Court held that the website “[was] not entitled to CDA 
immunity for the operation of its search system, which filters listings, or of its email 
notification system, which directs emails to subscribers according to discriminatory 
criteria.” Id. at 1167.6  The Court distinguished the defendant website’s unlawful 
search and notification functionalities from those of “ordinary search engines,” 
noting that the latter “do not use unlawful criteria to limit the scope of searches 
conducted on them, nor are they designed to achieve illegal ends.” 521 F.3d at 1167. 
Since “Roommate's search function is…designed to steer users based on [unlawful] 
criteria…[it] differs materially from generic search engines such as Google, Yahoo! 
and MSN Live Search, in that Roommate designed its system to use allegedly 
unlawful criteria so as to limit the results of each search, and to force users to 
participate in its [unlawful] process.”  Id.  
                                                 
6 This transposes identically to the facts at bar, as Plaintiff alleges that “Experience 
Project’s recommendations functionality…—written into the website’s source 
code—relied on data such as, but not limited to, the content of a given group, the 
content posted by the users within the group, and demographic data known by 
Experience Project about the given user, including the geographic location of the 
user.  In point of fact, this was expressly admitted by [Experience Project CEO]: 
‘Immediately, you’re drawn into groups that are structured around these 
experiences [that the user identifies as being relevant to himself or herself.’” Compl. 
at ¶ 28. 
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Roommates established a nuanced standard of what constitutes 
“development” of content under Section 230, which becomes critical for 
distinguishing an “interactive computer service” (who has immunity) from an 
“information content provider” (who does not).  The Court focused on the word 
“development” in the definition of an “information content provider”7 and cautioned 
not to “ignore[] the words ‘development…in part’ in the statutory passage 
‘creation or development in whole or in part.’” Id. at 1167 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 
230(f)(3)) (emphasis original).  Thus, a defendant website need not author the 
material at issue; instead, directing its development is enough to make that website 
an “information content provider.” Id. 
Critically, the Roommates opinion explained the “definition of ‘development’ 
that is [most] suitable to the context in which we operate [is the definition] ‘making 
usable or available.’”  Id. at 1168.  Under this standard, a website can be a developer 
without having created the content at issue so long as it makes its own use of that 
content in some material way.  Id.  Indisputably, under this authority, a website can 
face liability when it takes an active role in guiding the creation of content or in 
using that content for recommendations or email functionality (i.e., steering users 
throughout the platform).  See, generally, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). 
                                                 
7 “[A]ny person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive 
computer service.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). (emphasis added) 
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Equally instructive is Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Cal. 
2006) a district court opinion that predates Roommates but that was cited 
approvingly by this Court in its Roommates analysis. 521 F.3d at 1163, n.8 (citing 
Anthony, 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257).8  In Anthony, an aggrieved user of Yahoo’s dating 
site accused the company of (1) creating fraudulent user profiles sent to lure 
prospective customers, and (2) sending profiles of actual former subscribers, whose 
subscriptions had lapsed, to current members of the service. Id. Concerning the 
former business practice, the district court held that Yahoo was an “information 
content provider” as it allegedly created the profiles at issue.  Id. at 1262.  Moreover, 
concerning the profiles from lapsed accounts, the court held that “[a]dmittedly, third 
parties created these profiles. Nevertheless, the CDA only entitles Yahoo! not to be 
‘the publisher or speaker’ of the profiles. It does not absolve Yahoo! from liability 
for any accompanying misrepresentations. Because Anthony posits that Yahoo!'s 
manner of presenting the profiles – not the underlying profiles themselves – 
constitute fraud, the CDA does not apply.” Id. at 1263 (emphasis added). 
Since Roommates, this Court has continued to hold that claims involving 
third-party website content do not automatically trigger Section 230 immunities.  
                                                 
8 Specifically, the Court cited Anthony for the proposition that “a website may be 
immune from liability for some of the content it displays to the public but be subject 
to liability for other content.” Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1162-63 (citing Anthony v. 
Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262-63 (N.D. Cal. 2006)). 
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Instead, where the claim focuses on conduct of the website that is separate from the 
third-party content, a claim is not precluded even if it indisputably relates to or is 
intertwined with that third-party content. For example, in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 
570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009), a woman brought suit over a website’s failure to 
remove nude photos of her posted by her ex-boyfriend.  Id. at 1098.  While this Court 
held that Section 230 precluded the plaintiff’s negligence claim arising from the 
company’s allowing the photos to be published in the first instance (id. at 1105-06), 
the Court simultaneously held that a separate, promissory estoppel claim was not 
precluded, where Yahoo had made representations to the plaintiff that it would, 
indeed, remove the content (id. at 1107-09).  Although the estoppel claim 
unquestionably related to content posted by third parties, it arose from actions 
undertaken by Yahoo that were independent of the content’s posting in the first 
place.  Id.9   
Courts in other jurisdictions follow Roommates and make this same, correct, 
distinction—recognizing that challenging a defendant’s conduct vis-à-vis third-party 
content does not automatically equate to treating the website as a “publisher.”  See, 
e.g., FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1200-01 (10th Cir. 2009) (no Section 
                                                 
9 See, also Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2016) (failure 
to warn claim related to third-party posters on a website not afforded Section 230 
immunity because the duty existed independently of, and had no bearing on, any 
specific third-party content); Beckman v. Match.com, LLC, 668 F. App'x 759 (9th 
Cir. 2016) (same). 
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230 immunity when defendant “solicited requests” for telephone record information, 
“paid researchers to find it, [and] knew that the researchers were likely to use 
improper methods,” since its “actions were not ‘neutral’ with respect to generating 
offensive content; on the contrary, its actions were intended to generate such 
content.”) (citing to Fair Housing multiple times in its analysis).10   
The most factually apposite application of Roommates is a Washington state 
court case—J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC—in which three minor girls 
who were victims of sex trafficking sued Backpage.com, a website catering to online 
escort services that was used by the girls’ pimps.  184 Wash. 2d 95, 359 P.3d 714 
(2015) (en banc).  The plaintiffs argued that Section 230 did not immunize the 
defendant from their claims,11 as they alleged that the defendant’s posting policies 
                                                 
10 See, also City of Chicago, Ill. v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(no Section 230 immunity for ticket-seller website accused of posting and selling 
tickets without remitting proper taxes, because claim relating to collection of 
“Chicago’s amusement tax does not depend on who ‘publishes’ any information or 
is a ‘speaker,’”); Lansing v. Sw. Airlines Co., 980 N.E.2d 630, 639 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2012) (Airline that allowed its employee to access customer information in its 
computer systems and harass customers could not claim Section 230 immunity 
because “Plaintiff’s negligent supervision cause of action does not require 
publishing or speaking as a critical element, and holding defendant liable for its 
failure to supervise its employee after defendant had received notice of the 
employee’s wrongful conduct does not treat defendant as if it were the publisher or 
speaker of the alleged [harassing] e-mails and texts.”). 
11 The plaintiffs asserted claims for negligence, outrage, sexual exploitation of 
children, ratification/vicarious liability, unjust enrichment, invasion of privacy, 
sexual assault and battery, and civil conspiracy. J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, 
LLC, 184 Wash. 2d 95, 98-99, 359 P.3d 714, 716 (2015). 
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and site functionality were specifically designed, in whole or in part, to help their 
pimps evade detection from law enforcement.  Id. at 716.  Citing extensively to 
Roommates throughout, the Washington Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs’ 
allegations that Backpage “intentionally developed its website,” including through 
developing its content guidelines and functionality, to such a degree that it evidenced 
collusion (and thus a co-development relationship) between the website and the 
pimps who trafficked the underage girls.  Id. at 717-18.  The Washington Supreme 
Court reversed the lower court’s grant of the motion to dismiss, stating that further 
fact-finding was warranted “to ascertain whether in fact Backpage designed its 
posting rules to induce sex trafficking” and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.  Id at 718.12  
 Roommates and its progeny make clear that a website need not co-author a 
third party’s post to have “developed” the content pursuant to Section 230; it is 
                                                 
12 Plaintiff recognizes that the First Circuit reached the opposite conclusion under 
similar facts and with similar arguments.  See, generally, Doe v. Backpage.com, 
LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016).  This opinion is distinguishable, however, as the 
First Circuit was bound by different precedent employing an especially (and in 
Plaintiff’s view, improperly) broad reading of Section 230 immunity.  Id. at 21, n.5 
(“The appellants argue that a concurring opinion in J.S. v. Village Voice Media 
Holdings, L.L.C., 184 Wn.2d 95, 359 P.3d 714, 718-24 (Wash. 2015) (en banc) 
(Wiggins, J., concurring), points to a different conclusion. But our reasoning in 
[Universal Commun. Sys. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007)] — which 
the J.S. concurrence failed to address — defeats this argument.”).  The proper 
analytic framework in this Court, of course, is set forth in Roommates, which Doe v. 
Backpage.com does not address, much less reconcile. 
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enough that the website manipulates the content in a unique way.  This manipulation 
can take myriad forms, including guiding the content’s generation, either through 
posting guidelines that signal or direct the poster,13 content requirements for posts,14 
or even post hoc use of content that was generated either in whole or in part by a 
third party.15   
These authorities reflect a nuanced standard set by this Court, which 
recognizes that websites have changed dramatically since passing of the 
Communications Decency Act.  Most websites no longer passively “publish” a 
user’s post to a static message board, and thus no longer serve as a mere “passive 
conduit” for the message.  In certain circumstances, such as with social media 
networks like Experience Project, the relationship between the website and its users 
is more symbiotic, with the website taking the users’ input and making its own 
derived content, then using that content for its own functionality and purpose.   
ii. The District Court Misapplied Roommates by Holding That 
the Recommendations Functionality That Knowingly 
Matched Heroin Addicts to Heroin Dealers Was a “Neutral 
Tool,” as Opposed to an Instance of Independently 
Developed Content.  
 
In light of the rule established by Roommates and its progeny, the district court 
was incorrect in holding that Experience Project’s manipulation of site content (and 
                                                 
13 Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1164; J.S., 359 P.3d at 717-18.  
14 Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1164. 
15 Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1164; Anthony, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 1263. 
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its users) did not rise to the level of “information content provider” activity.  The 
court erroneously classified the recommendations and push notifications, which 
identified heroin addicts and steered them towards heroin dealers, as “content-
neutral tools” and (equally erroneously) held that it was immaterial that their intent 
was to steer vulnerable users towards unlawful content.  ER16.  The court’s 
reasoning was threefold: “[f]irst, making recommendations to website users and 
alerting them to posts are ordinary, neutral functions of social-network 
websites[;]16…[s]econd, it is the users’ voluntary inputs that create the content on 
Experience Project, not Ultimate Software’s proprietary algorithms17[; 
and]…[t]hird, the result holds even when a website collects information about users 
and classifies user characteristics.”18  None of these points is correct, factually or 
legally. 
1. The Functionality Challenged by Plaintiff Involved 
Case-By-Case, Subjective Determinations On the Part 
of the Website and Its Programmers, and Cannot Be 
Classified as “Neutral.” 
 
First, the act of making a recommendation is, by definition, not “neutral.”   
The district court held that “Ms. Dyroff does not plausibly allege that Ultimate 
Software ‘promoted the use of [its neutral] tools for unlawful purposes,” ER17 
                                                 
16 ER16 
17 ER17 
18 ER18 
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(citing Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174 n. 37) (alterations in the original), but this 
ignores the specific allegations in the Complaint and stretches the word “neutral” to 
its breaking point.19  Instead, Defendant used its website’s proprietary technology to 
identify Wesley Greer as a heroin addict, search through posts it knew pertained to 
the sale of heroin, and prod him—through its own, separate content—towards those 
posts. ER41:¶26-ER45:¶35; ER50:¶49-¶50; ER50:¶52.  An example of what Wesley 
Greer saw is as follows: 
 
                                                 
19 Merriam Webster defines “neutral” as “not engaged on either side” and “not 
decided or pronounced as to characteristics: indifferent.” (https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/neutral) (last visited June 12, 2018) 
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Fig. 120 
 
As the above demonstrates, Experience Project’s recommendations functionality 
(shown in the bottom right corner of figure 1) was purposefully designed to engage 
in deliberate decision-making, and to present users with custom content, generated 
by Experience Project based on the decisions the website made.  The act of making 
a recommendation is deliberative—it requires evaluating (1) the subject matter being 
recommended and (2) the person to whom the recommendation is being made, and 
making choices in light of those evaluations. 
 To call Experience Project’s machine learning and algorithmic functionality 
“neutral” fundamentally misunderstands algorithms, their origin, and their purpose.  
Algorithms are portions of code, programmed by individuals to achieve the goals of 
those individuals—specifically, for the code to make decisions as those individuals’ 
proxy.  Because algorithms are the product of human endeavor, they carry all of the 
complexities and deliberation of human decision-making (and attendant room for 
error and even illegal results).  This is an acknowledged problem, for instance, in the 
field of hiring practices and employment law.  As one recent article noted, algorithms 
risk adopting human biases and, accordingly, effecting unlawful results: 
At their core, algorithms mimic human decision making. 
They are typically trained to learn from past successes, 
which may embed existing bias. For example, in a famous 
                                                 
20 ER42:¶27 
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experiment, recruiters reviewed identical resumes and 
selected more applicants with white-sounding names than 
with black-sounding ones. If the algorithm learns what a 
“good” hire looks like based on that kind of biased data, it 
will make biased hiring decisions. The result is that 
automatic resume screening software often evaluates job 
applicants based on subjective criteria, such as one’s 
name. By latching on to the wrong features, this approach 
discounts the candidate’s true potential. 
 
Gideon Mann and Cathy O’Neil, “Hiring Algorithms Are Not Neutral.” Harvard 
Business Review (Dec. 9, 2016) (available at https://hbr.org/2016/12/hiring-
algorithms-are-not-neutral) (last visited June 6, 2018).  The authors stress that 
“[a]lgorithms are, in part, our opinions embedded in code.” Id. “In other words, 
algorithms are not neutral.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 It is not speculative that biases inherent in algorithms lead to unlawfully 
discriminatory conduct that exists completely outside of Section 230’s scope.  
Another article addressing this issue provides an empirical example: 
In one study, Harvard professor Latanya Sweeney looked 
at the Google AdSense ads that came up during searches 
of names associated with white babies (Geoffrey, Jill, 
Emma) and names associated with black babies 
(DeShawn, Darnell, Jermaine). She found that ads 
containing the word “arrest” were shown next to more than 
80 percent of “black” name searches but fewer than 30 
percent of “white” name searches….Sweeney worries that 
the ways Google’s advertising technology perpetuates 
racial bias could undermine a black person’s chances in a 
competition, whether it’s for an award, a date, or a job. 
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Nanette Byrnes, “Why We Should Expect Algorithms to Be Biased,” MIT 
Technology Review (Jun. 24, 2016) (available at 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601775/why-we-should-expect-algorithms-
to-be-biased/) (last visited June 6, 2018).  In the above study, Google’s algorithms 
made deliberate, and discriminatory, choices of how to present third-party-generated 
content to individual users based on what it new or inferred about the users (through 
their search terms).  Clearly, its “tools” (i.e., its algorithms) were anything but 
“neutral” in the presentation of this third-party-generated content. 
The same holds true for Experience Project’s functionalities challenged by 
Plaintiff in this litigation.  As pled in the Complaint, Experience Project’s unlawful 
activity took the form of, inter alia, (1) specifically identifying the meaning of and 
intent behind each and every post on its website;21 (2) using that derived information 
to create new content that would  manipulate individual users and funnel them into 
pockets of activity on the website, including harmful, drug-trafficking activity; (3) 
shielding bad actors from law enforcement requests (through both the blanket 
anonymity policy in its posting guidelines and its express antipathy towards law 
enforcement information requests); and (4) developing policies and procedures (and 
                                                 
21 ER39:¶ 22 (citing http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/wp2017-01.pdf). 
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engineering its software) to effectuate these goals.22  These actions—accepted as 
true, taken as a whole, and interpreted with all inferences drawn in Plaintiff’s favor—
more than plausibly assert that Experience Project used its “tools for unlawful 
purposes”23 and that those tools were not neutral.  On the above facts, Plaintiff 
readily satisfied the pleadings requirements at the motion to dismiss stage. Ashcroft 
v. Iqball, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (“The 
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more 
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”) (quoting Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 557). 
These facts also demonstrate the inapposite nature of the authority relied upon 
by the district court in its analysis.  The court cited to a troika of cases for the 
proposition that website functionality is a “neutral tool.”  ER16-ER17 citing 
Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Fields v. Twitter, 
Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 
3d 140 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2017).  However, each of those cases distills to a claim 
                                                 
22 See, e.g., ER34¶ 6-ER35:¶8, ER38:¶19, ER39:¶22-ER40:¶23, ER41:¶26-
ER48:¶42, ER50:¶52-¶53, ER55:¶70-ER56:¶71, ER56:¶73-ER57:¶74, ER61:¶94-
ER62:¶96, ER63:¶105-¶106, ER65:¶115-ER66:¶117. 
23 ER17. 
  Case: 18-15175, 06/13/2018, ID: 10907234, DktEntry: 12, Page 42 of 62
Dyroff v. The Ultimate Software Group – No. 18-15175                                                                                                                                                                                         
34 
 
by a plaintiff against a website simply for allowing individuals from terrorist 
organizations to access the website as a normal user.24   
Where, like here, a website’s functionality is “designed to steer users based 
on [unlawful] criteria,” its tools are not content-neutral and its behavior “differs 
materially from generic search engines such as Google, Yahoo! and MSN Live 
Search.”  Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1167.  Instead, the website has “designed its 
system to use allegedly unlawful criteria so as to limit the results of each search, and 
to force users to participate in its [unlawful] process,” and Section 230 does not 
apply. Id.; Anthony, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 1263 (Because [plaintiff] posits that Yahoo!'s 
manner of presenting the profiles – not the underlying profiles themselves – 
constitute fraud, the CDA does not apply.”) (emphasis added).  The district court 
was therefore in error and should be reversed. 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., Gonzalez, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1165 (plaintiffs asserted “that their claims 
are based upon the fact that Google provides ISIS followers with access to powerful 
tools and equipment to publish their own content” via Google’s website YouTube); 
Fields, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1122 (plaintiffs’ claims were premised on a theory of 
liability “based purely on Defendant’s knowing provision of Twitter accounts to 
ISIS, not content created with those accounts.”); Cohen, 252 F. Supp. 3d at 157 
(E.D.N.Y. 2017) (“Plaintiffs argue that their claims seek to hold Facebook liable for 
‘provision of services’ to Hamas in the form of account access ‘coupled with 
Facebook's refusal to use available resources … to identify and shut down Hamas [] 
accounts.’”). Only one case, Gonzalez, advanced an argument that the website 
actually developed additional content, but this was limited to targeted advertising 
served on the website, generally, which is a far cry from the deliberate and specific 
conduct challenged in this litigation.  282 F. Supp. 3d at 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2017) 
(rejecting the claim by plaintiffs “that Google acts as an ‘information content 
provider’ [developing its own content] by placing targeted ads.”). 
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2. The Website, Not Third-Party Users, Created the 
Harmful Content Challenged By Plaintiff. 
 
Second, because the harmful content and conduct challenged is the 
recommendations functionality and push notifications, the district court was 
incorrect in holding that “the users’ voluntary inputs…create the content on 
Experience Project, not Ultimate Software’s proprietary algorithms.” Instead, those 
“voluntary inputs” (like Margenat-Castro’s open advertisements for heroin) merely 
contribute to Experience Project’s unlawful activity and content that Plaintiff 
challenged in her complaint.  Experience Project then took those heroin trafficking 
posts, determined their precise and unlawful meaning, determined the intent of the 
poster, and then elected to use those posts and similarly unlawful posts to entice 
users whom they deemed a suitable (here, vulnerable) audience.  ER38:¶18-
ER45:¶35.   
While Section 230 might preclude a claim against a website owner for 
allowing heroin trafficking posts on their website, it does not follow that the website 
is shielded from knowingly steering visitors towards that content and pressuring 
those visitors to view and engage with the harmful posts.  Roommates, 523 F.3d at 
1165 (“[T]he fact that users are information content providers does not preclude 
Roommate from also being an information content provider by helping ‘develop’ at 
least ‘in part’ the information in the profiles.”) (emphasis original).   
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In point of fact, the third-party poster has no control over the functionality that 
is challenged in the Complaint.  Margenat-Castro had no agency in what was shown 
and recommended to Wesley Greer.  ER46:¶36-ER48:¶42.  Instead, the 
recommendations-based content was chosen, packaged, and presented by 
Experience Project.  Id.  This is precisely the type of “development…in whole or in 
part” contemplated by Section 230 and contextualized in this Court’s holding in 
Roommates. 521 F.3d at 1168 (the “definition of ‘development’ that is [most] 
suitable to the context in which we operate [is the definition] ‘making usable or 
available.’”).25 
                                                 
25 As with its analysis in the preceding section, the district court again relied on easily 
distinguishable authority.  ER17-ER18, citing Kimzey v. Yelp, 836 F.3d 1263 (9th 
Cir. 2016); Goddard v. Google, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2009).  Kimzey 
involved a pro se plaintiff bringing RICO and libel claims against a website over the 
posting of a disparaging review from a disgruntled customer.  836 F.3d 1263 (9th 
Cir. 2016).  The Court noted that the plaintiff’s “complaint [was] far from lucid and 
the opening brief cryptic to the point of opacity” and that the court was forced to 
attempt to discern the plaintiff’s relevant arguments. Id. at 1268.  First, the court 
interpreted the plaintiff as claiming that Yelp, itself, wrote the disparaging review, 
which the court deemed were “threadbare allegations” and dismissed pursuant to 
Iqbal.  Id.  “The second, and more convoluted, [argument] is that Yelp transformed 
the review…into its own ‘advertisement’ or ‘promotion’ on Google and featured a 
unique star-rating system as the mantlepiece of its creation.” Id. at 1269.  Ultimately, 
it is unclear what the true allegations were in the case, much less how they might 
have any bearing on Plaintiff’s underlying claims.  Similarly, in Godard, plaintiffs 
brought fraud claims arising from third-party ads placed on Google’s ad network.  
640 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2009).  In asserting that Google materially 
contributed to the third-party advertisers’ fraudulent activity, the only alleged 
collaboration between Google and the third parties was Google’s automated 
suggestion of the phrase “free ringtone” when an advertiser sought to place adds 
related to the word “ringtone.”  Id. at 1197.  The plaintiff “contend[ed] that the 
  Case: 18-15175, 06/13/2018, ID: 10907234, DktEntry: 12, Page 45 of 62
Dyroff v. The Ultimate Software Group – No. 18-15175                                                                                                                                                                                         
37 
 
3. The District Court Relied on An Overly-Broad 
Interpretation of Carafano—An Opinion Abridged by 
Roommates—When It Held That Websites Cannot Co-
Develop Content From Third-Party Posts. 
 
Third, the district court erred in holding—with almost no analysis—that the 
fact that Experience Project “collects information about users and classifies user 
characteristics” was immaterial to its Section 230 analysis.  ER18.  Stating that 
Experience Project “is immune, and not an ‘information content provider,’ as long 
as users generate all content,” the district court supported its reasoning with 
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003), an opinion 
that is readily distinguishable, which predates Roommates and which, in point of 
fact, required clarification from this Court in the Roommates opinion because of the 
“unduly broad” language in its Section 230 analysis. 521 F.3d at 1171 (“We must… 
clarify the reasoning undergirding our holding in Carafano[,] as we used language 
there that was unduly broad.”). 
In Carafano, the plaintiff sued a dating website after an unknown third party 
created a false profile containing, inter alia, sexually suggestive content and her 
phone number and address.  339 F.3d at 1121.  This Court stated that the website 
was immune from suit under these facts—it could not “be considered an 
                                                 
suggestion of the word ‘free,’ when combined with Google's knowledge of the 
mobile content industry’s unauthorized charge problems, makes the Keyword Tool 
neither innocuous nor neutral.” Id. (internal quotations, citations omitted). 
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‘information content provider’ under the statute because no profile has any content 
until a user actively creates it.” 339 F.3d 1124; compare ER18 (“The website is 
immune, and not an ‘information content provider,’ as long as users generate all 
content.”) (citing Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124). 
In Roommates, this Court clarified that this was too broad a read of the statute 
(although the result of Carafano was still appropriate under a much more cabined 
read of Section 230’s scope).  This Court observed that, in Carafano, 
We correctly held that the website was immune, but 
incorrectly suggested that it could never be liable because 
“no [dating] profile has any content until a user actively 
creates it.” 
 
As we explain above…even if the data are supplied by 
third parties, a website operator may still contribute to the 
content's illegality and thus be liable as a developer. 
Providing immunity every time a website uses data 
initially obtained from third parties would eviscerate the 
exception to section 230 for “develop[ing]” unlawful 
content “in whole or in part.” 
 
521 F. 3d at 1171 (internal citations omitted).  Ultimately,   
 
a more plausible rationale for the unquestionably correct 
result in Carafano is this: The allegedly libelous content 
there—the false implication that Carafano was unchaste—
was created and developed entirely by the malevolent user, 
without prompting or help from the website 
operator….The claim against the website was, in effect, 
that it failed to review each user-created profile to ensure 
that it wasn’t defamatory. That is precisely the kind of 
activity for which Congress intended to grant absolution 
with the passage of section 230. With respect to the 
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defamatory content, the website operator was merely a 
passive conduit and thus could not be held liable for failing 
to detect and remove it. 
 
Id. at 1171-72.  It is indisputable that Carafano’s holding was cabined significantly 
by the above language.  The district court’s reliance on that opinion thus was 
misplaced, given the fact that it failed to take into account the clarification (and 
paring down) of the scope of Carafano’s holding, as explicitly articulated in 
Roommates. 
 As stated above, Plaintiff’s claims against the website are not “in effect, that 
it failed to review each user-created profile to ensure that it wasn’t [unlawful].” 531 
F.3d. at 1171.  Instead, Plaintiff’s claims are squarely grounded in how the “website 
use[d] data initially obtained from third parties,” and arise from Experience Project’s 
act of “‘develop[ing]’ unlawful content ‘in whole or in part.’”  Id. (alteration 
original).  Accordingly, the district court erred in its reliance on portions of 
Carafano’s holding that are inconsistent with Roommates. 
iii. Plaintiff Plausibly Alleged Collusion Between Defendant 
and Its Heroin-Trafficking User Base 
 
Separately, the district court erred in applying Section 230 despite Plaintiff’s 
plausible allegations of Defendant’s collusive activity with its criminal 
accountholders. Specifically, Plaintiff contended that Experience Project could not 
assert Section 230 immunity because it “developed” unlawful content via the 
policies and procedures it had established—at least in part—with knowledge and 
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endorsement of the illegal activity on its website, and with an intent to shield 
criminal users from law enforcement requests.  ER18.  Beyond citing to the 
website’s strict anonymity policy, Plaintiff also cited to a March, 2016, 
announcement from the website that it was suspending operations, due to increased 
requests from law enforcement.  ER18-19.  In an open letter to account holders, 
Experience Project’s CEO stated: 
From day one, privacy of our users has been 
paramount, and we have never allowed names, phone 
numbers, or addresses. This approach bucked every trend, 
and challenged our ability to build an advertising-based 
business, but we passionately believe it provided the 
foundation for some of the most meaningful relationships 
imaginable. And you are proof that we were right! But 
there is no denying that the way people expect to use social 
media today is markedly different than it once was, and as 
the primary use has moved from web to mobile, our 
hallmark attributes like long-form stories are not aligned. 
 
But, there are deeper, and more troubling trends than 
formats. Online anonymity, a core part of EP, is being 
challenged like never before. Governments and their 
agencies are aggressively attacking the foundations of 
internet privacy with a deluge of information requests, 
subpoenas, and warrants. We, of course, always support 
proper law enforcement efforts, but the well-documented 
potential for even abuse, even if unintentional, is 
enormous, and growing.26 
 
This statement makes it indisputable that Experience Project shuttered its website, 
in no small part, because of law enforcement’s interest in its user’s activity.  It is 
                                                 
26 See, also ER47:¶41  
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equally indisputable that Experience Project viewed the actions of law enforcement 
as “aggressively attacking the foundations of internet privacy with a deluge of 
information requests, subpoenas, and warrants.”   
 The district court inferred the statement in the letter unfavorably to Plaintiff, 
finding that “[t]his statement manifests a concern with Internet privacy that has been 
widespread in the technology sector and does not establish antipathy towards law 
enforcement especially given the statement about ‘proper law enforcement 
requests.’” ER19.  In choosing this interpretation, the district court ignored the fact 
that the website’s CEO deemed himself arbiter of what is and is not a “proper” law 
enforcement request and viewed the requests directed at his website as a “deluge of 
information requests, subpoenas, and warrants” that “aggressively attack[ed] the 
foundations of internet privacy.”  These words plausibly demonstrate an antipathy 
towards law enforcement or an interest in shielding users from the prying eyes of the 
police, an inference the district court should have drawn in Plaintiff’s favor. 
 On a scanter record, courts have found a level of collusion sufficient that the 
website’s posting policies and guidelines “developed,” in whole or in part, the 
offending third-party content, and accordingly Section 230 did not apply.  As 
discussed above, in J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, three minor girls who 
had been victims of human trafficking sued the website Backpage.com 
(“Backpage”), which their pimps utilized to traffic the girls.  184 Wash. 2d 95, 359 
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P.3d 714 (2015).  In arguing that Section 230 did not apply to their claims against 
Backpage, the young women pointed to the website’s posting guidelines, asserting 
that the site’s “advertisement posting rules were ‘designed to help pimps develop 
advertisements that can evade the unwanted attention of law enforcement, while still 
conveying the illegal message.’”  Id. at 714.  Critically, the pimps posted 
advertisements on the website “without any special guidance” or direct input from 
Backpage personnel, but because the website’s posting guidelines prohibited posters 
from using certain, coded language to signal underage prostitution (yet nonetheless 
knew such human trafficking was occurring on its site), the plaintiffs argued that the 
website provided cover for the pimps to engage in their unlawful and unspeakably 
harmful activity.  Id. at 716. 
In an en banc opinion that relied extensively on this Court’s analysis in 
Roommates, the Supreme Court of Washington held that it was enough, at the 
pleadings stage, for plaintiffs to allege that Backpage was aware of the human 
trafficking taking place on its website, and designed its posting guidelines to 
facilitate this bad act (by giving pimps both anonymity and plausible deniability).  
Id. at 717-18.  Taking as true, inter alia, the plaintiffs’ allegations that Backpage’s 
posting guidelines were “a method developed by Backpage.com to allow pimps, 
prostitutes, and Backpage.com to evade law enforcement for illegal sex trafficking, 
including the trafficking of minors for sex,” the court held that the website did “more 
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than simply maintain neutral policies prohibiting or limiting certain content,” and 
plaintiffs had plausibly alleged development of content sufficient that Section 230 
did not apply.  Id. 
This readily analogizes to the facts at bar.  Like the young girls in J.S., Plaintiff 
identified Experience Project’s unlawful engagement and management of illegal 
activity in the form of shielding bad actors (of whom it had actual knowledge) from 
law enforcement review through its blanket anonymity policy and posting 
guidelines.27 Going one step further than the plaintiffs in J.S., Plaintiff cited to 
specific proof that, at least in part, the website’s policies were created and maintained 
to give users cover from law enforcement, which Experience Project’s CEO 
characterized as “aggressive[]” and “attacking the foundations of internet privacy.”  
Plaintiff more than plausibly alleged collusion between Experience Project and its 
drug-trafficking users, sufficient to demonstrate at the pleadings stage that the 
website “contribute[d] materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct.” J.S., 359 
P.3d at 718 (2015) (quoting Fair Hous. Council, 521 F.3d at 1168).   
Rather than an instance of a “clever lawyer argu[ing] that something the 
website operator did encouraged the illegality,” the facts at bar and the behavior at 
issue demonstrate an agency and intentionality on behalf of Experience Project that 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., ER34¶ 6-ER35:¶8, ER38:¶19, ER39:¶22-ER40:¶23, ER41:¶26-
ER48:¶42, ER50:¶52-¶53, ER55:¶70-ER56:¶71, ER56:¶73-ER57:¶74, ER61:¶94-
ER62:¶96, ER63:¶105-¶106, ER65:¶115-ER66:¶117. 
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resulted in material contribution to profoundly bad acts, thereby removing Section 
230 immunity. Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1174-75.  Because of the level of collusion 
and misfeasance on the part of Experience Project, Section 230 immunity does not 
apply and the district court should be reversed. 
iv. The District Court Erred in Holding That No Duty Was 
Owed to Wesley Greer 
 
In dismissing Plaintiff’s failure to warn claim,28 the district court erred in 
holding that Experience Project did not owe a duty of care to Wesley Greer, both 
due to its own misfeasance and due to the general duty owed by a social media 
website to its users. 
1. Defendant’s Misfeasance Created a Duty Owed to 
Wesley Greer. 
 
Under California law, in determining whether a defendant owes a duty to a 
plaintiff in a particular case, courts distinguish between misfeasance and 
nonfeasance. See, e.g., Seo v. All-Makes Overhead Doors, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1193, 
1202, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 160 (2002). “Misfeasance exists when the defendant is 
responsible for making the plaintiff's position worse, i.e., defendant has created a 
                                                 
28 Specifically, Plaintiff contended that Experience Project had actual knowledge of 
the fact that Margenat-Castro was purporting to sell heroin on the website, when in 
fact it was pure fentanyl, and that the website’s failure to warn Wesley Greer of this 
fact led to his overdose and homicideER63:¶102-ER64:¶111.  This Court holds that 
Section 230 does not apply to failure to warn claims. Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 
824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. May 31, 2016). 
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risk. Conversely, nonfeasance is found when the defendant has failed to aid plaintiff 
through beneficial intervention.” Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 49, 123 
Cal. Rptr. 468, 539 P.2d 36 (1975). In cases of misfeasance, the question of duty is 
governed by the standards of ordinary care, i.e. “a person ordinarily is obligated to 
exercise due care in his or her own actions so as not to create an unreasonable risk 
of injury to others, and this legal duty generally is owed to the class of persons who 
it is reasonably foreseeable may be injured as the result of the actor's conduct.” Lugtu 
v. California Highway Patrol, 26 Cal. 4th 703, 716, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528, 28 P.3d 
249 (2001). See also Cal. Civ. Code § 1714 (“Everyone is responsible, not only for 
the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by 
his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or 
person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought 
the injury upon himself or herself.”). 
Stating that Plaintiff simply “contend[ed] that [Experience Project] created a 
risk of harm through its website functionalities and thus owed her son an ordinary 
duty of care,” the district court held that Experience Project’s “use of the neutral 
tools and functionalities on its website” did not rise to misfeasance.  ER26.   
However, as stated in Sections VI.A.ii.1 and VI.A.ii.2, this mischaracterizes not only 
the intentionality and effect of the challenged functionalities, but also Experience 
Project’s own commitment to allowing illegal activity on its website.  Where an 
  Case: 18-15175, 06/13/2018, ID: 10907234, DktEntry: 12, Page 54 of 62
Dyroff v. The Ultimate Software Group – No. 18-15175                                                                                                                                                                                         
46 
 
entity knowingly identifies heroin addicts and knowingly steers them towards heroin 
dealers, and where that same website intentionally seeks to hide that unlawful 
behavior from law enforcement, it has created a risk through its own misfeasance.  
Weirum,15 Cal. 3d at 49.  Because the functionalities were not neutral, and because 
Experience Project purposely sought to create an environment that shielded bad 
actors, it owed a duty of care to Wesley Greer for the risk it helped create, and the 
district court erred in holding otherwise. 
2. California Law Recognizes a Special Relationship in 
Circumstances Analogous to Social Media Websites. 
 
As stated in Plaintiff’s Complaint, a social network like Experience Project, 
with its business model of building and cultivating “communities” and “groups,” is 
the twenty-first century equivalent of a brick and mortar business establishment. Just 
like restaurants, bars, theaters, fairs, auditoriums, stadiums, amusement parks, and 
all other businesses open to the public, Defendant enticed members of the public to 
congregate on Experience Project website in furtherance of Defendant’s business 
interest and in a manner entirely consonant with traditional concepts of public 
gathering.  Compl. at ¶¶ 88-91.   
In defining the scope of the duty owed by a business establishment to its 
invitees, the California Supreme Court stated that a “proprietor is…required to 
exercise reasonable care for the[] safety [of invitees] and is liable for injuries 
resulting from a breach of this duty.” Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc., 65 Cal. 2d 
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114, 121, 52 Cal. Rptr. 561, 565, 416 P.2d 793, 797 (1966).  The duty includes 
“tak[ing] affirmative action to control the wrongful acts of third persons which 
threaten invitees where the occupant has reasonable cause to anticipate such acts and 
the probability of injury resulting therefrom.” Id. 
 Plaintiff’s position that a website is akin to a physical business finds support 
in the law.  In Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 
2000), eBay sought a preliminary injunction to prevent another website from sending 
“web crawlers” (programs that scan a website’s HTML code) to eBay’s website to 
obtain information about the various auctions that were occurring at any given time.  
One of eBay’s causes of action was trespass, and it illustrated this claim by 
describing the defendant’s behavior “as equivalent to sending in an army of 100,000 
robots a day to check the prices in a competitor’s store.” Id. at 1065.  The court noted 
that any distinction between eBay (a virtual store) and a brick and mortar store would 
be “formalistic” and stated, in an explanatory footnote, that the modern trend was 
moving from physical to online business.  Id. at 1065, n.11.  The court concluded 
that the defendant’s behavior not only was a trespass, it was “more akin to the 
traditional notion of a trespass to real property, than the traditional notion of a 
trespass to chattels.”  Id. at 1067 (emphasis added). A portion of the court’s analysis 
rested on the fact that the information requests sent from defendant’s computers to 
eBay’s servers were sufficiently “tangible” to equate to defendant’s physical 
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presence (and thus interference) of eBay’s property.  Id. at 1069 (“It appears likely 
that the electronic signals sent by [the defendant] to retrieve information from eBay’s 
computer system are . . . sufficiently tangible to support a trespass cause of action.”); 
see also Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1566-67, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 468, 473 (1996) (same); Compuserve Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, 962 F. Supp. 
1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (same); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 
438 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Verio likely committed a trespass by using a search robot to 
access Register.com's computer systems without authorization to do so.”) (citing 
eBay, 100 F.Supp.2d at 1071, for the brunt of its analysis). 
 The same applies when an individual visits a website: when Wesley Greer 
visited the Experience Project website, HTTP requests were sent by his browser to 
Experience Project’s server and that quantum of physical presence and connection 
was just as material in that moment as it was in eBay and the other, above cases.  The 
district court conceded that the reasoning in eBay was sound and that a physical 
connection joined the parties—“[eBay’s] result makes sense: there was a threatened 
physical incursion onto eBay’s website” (ER25:n.56)—but failed to explain why, 
considering that parties physically “visit” websites when they load their content from 
their servers, it does not follow that websites may (and should) be treated as physical 
businesses. 
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Nor was the district court correct in its analysis that “[r]isk can be more 
apparent in the real world than in the virtual social-network world.” ER25.  The 
record is replete with allegations that Experience Project claimed to know the 
meaning and intention behind every post of every user. ER38:¶18-ER45:¶35.  If 
anything, the district court’s logic militates in favor of Plaintiff’s position, since in 
the brick-and-mortar world, a business establishment cannot monitor every single 
invitee or encounter on its premises (yet has a duty to exercise ordinary care in doing 
just that).  In the virtual world, the opposite is true.  A company like Experience 
Project specifically designs its website to be a panopticon that mines, records, 
analyzes and stores every interaction taking place on its premises. Id.  Under the 
district court’s logic, it would be unfair to brick-and-mortar establishments to hold 
them to the same monitoring standards as social media websites.  Not the other way 
around. 
Although incorrectly applied by the district court, the above case law, 
analogizing websites to “brick and mortar” businesses for purposes of tort analysis 
in the trespass context, resolves the doubts expressed by other courts tasked with 
analyzing the relationship between websites and visitors, and acknowledging that 
there is a lack of California law to resolve this “difficult question.” Doe v. Internet 
Brands, No. 2:12-cv-3626-JFW (PJW), ECF. No. 51at *5 (C.D. Cal. November 14, 
2016).  Since a special relationship existed between Experience Project (a business 
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proprietor) and its accountholder Wesley Greer (an invitee),29 a duty was owed.  Id. 
(“‘Special relationships’ that courts have found to trigger a duty to protect another 
from foreseeable injury caused by a third party include…those between…business 
proprietors…and their tenants, patrons, or invitees.”); accord Beckman v. 
Match.com, No. 2:13-cv-00097-JCM-NJK, ECF No. 43, at *4 (Dist. Nev. March 10, 
2017).  The district court erred in reaching the opposite conclusion. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Section 230 was not introduced to transform the internet into a lawless 
vacuum in which the vulnerable are preyed upon and left with no recourse, yet this 
is what the district court’s reading of Section 230 immunity achieves.  This Court 
made clear that such a result must be avoided:  
The Internet is no longer a fragile new means of 
communication that could easily be smothered in the 
cradle by overzealous enforcement of laws and regulations 
applicable to brick-and-mortar businesses. Rather, it has 
become a dominant—perhaps the preeminent—means 
through which commerce is conducted. And its vast reach 
into the lives of millions is exactly why we must be careful 
not to exceed the scope of the immunity provided by 
Congress and thus give online businesses an unfair 
advantage over their real-world counterparts, which must 
comply with laws of general applicability. 
 
                                                 
29 See, Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000); 
Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1566-67, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 
473 (1996); Compuserve Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D. 
Ohio 1997); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 438 (2d Cir. 2004) 
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Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1164 n.15.  Plaintiff is both cognizant of and sympathetic 
to Section 230’s goal to protect “Good Samaritan” websites from any liability they 
might be exposed to in attempting to curb abuse across their service.  But Plaintiff 
is not trying to impose liability on good Samaritans.  She is seeking to hold 
Defendant liable for its own bad acts.   
For the reasons stated herein, the district court’s decision should be reversed. 
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